NEWSPAPER LIBEL: BARRIERS TO EXPANDING
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Recent litigation of national interest involving The New York Times has
brought into focus the obstacles preventing allegedly libelled persons from
obtaining jurisdiction over newspapers and their correspondents. In New
York Times v. Conner' the court of appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered
only the jurisdictional aspect of seven libel actions brought by Alabama citizens against a New York publishing corporation and a Connecticut citizen.
A New York Times correspondent had traveled in Alabama for five days under
instructions from his employer. After returning to New York he wrote an
article published in The Times on April 12, 1960, datelined: "Birmingham,
Ala., April 8."2 Six city commissioners of Birmingham and nearby Bessemer
brought separate libel actions against the newspaper in the federal court for
the Northern District of Alabama. A seventh libel suit based upon the same
article was filed in an Alabama state court but was removed to the district
court. The correspondent was named as co-defendant in four of these actions.
Each suit charged that The New York Times published a defamatory article
entitled "Fear and Hatred Grip Birmingham." 3 Plaintiffs claimed a total of
$3,100,000 actual and punitive damages. 4 The suits were consolidated in the
district court for the purpose of hearing defendants' motions to quash service
of process.
Personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendant was asserted under separate statutory provisions by service in Alabama upon purported agents of the
publishing company 5 and by substituted service upon the Secretary of State. 6
Personal jurisdiction over the individual defendant was attempted by substituted service alone.
Section 193 of the Alabama Civil Remedies and Procedure Act provides for
personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which "has carried on or
transacted business in this state without qualifying to do business herein as is
provided by the Constitution and statutes of this state... concerning causes
of action arising out of or as consequence of acts or business done in this
state ..... Process may be served upon "any agent or servant of such foreign
corporation who has made contracts for the corporation or did the act which
1 291 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1961).

2 N.Y. Times, April 12, 1960, p. 1, col. 1.
3 Ibid. See also N.Y. Times, June 15, 1961, p. 22, col. 4.
4 N.Y. Times, May 17, 1961, p. 22, col. 3.
5 ALA. CODE TIT. 7, § 193 (1960).
6 ALA. CODE TiT. 7, § 199(1) (1960).
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constituted the doing of business in this state .... ,"7The district court granted
The Times' motion to quash service under this section after finding that the
men served were not agents.8 That decision was not appealed. 9
Substituted service was made on the Secretary of State under the provisions
of Section 199(1) of the same Act:
Any nonresident person, firm... or any corporation not qualified... as

to doing business herein, who shall do any business or perform any character of work or service in this state shall, by the doing of such business
or the performing of such work, or services, be deemed to have appointed
the secretaty of state.., agent of such nonresident, upon whom process
may be served in any action accrued or accruing from the doing of such business, or the performing of such work, or service, or as an incident thereto
by any such nonresident, or his, its or their agent ....
Defendants' motions to quash service under this provision, however, were
denied. The district court held that "the article complained of by the plaintiffs, which appeared in The New York Times, and any causes of action accruing therefrom, were an incident to the performance of work or service in the
state of Alabama by Mr. Salisbury."10 The defendants appealed from this
ruling upon both constitutional and non-constitutional grounds.
In considering the jurisdictional problem, the Fifth Circuit relied upon a
prior Alabama decision relating to newspaper libel which held that "in an
action for libel against a newspaper the injury-the breach of duty--occurs,
within the meaning and application of the venue statute, at the place where
the newspaper is primarily published, and not in other places where it is...
merely circulated... ."11 Since The Times was published in New York, none
of the reporter's activities ripened into a cause of action in Alabama.
The court, examining the Louisiana statute authorizing substituted service, 12 observed that Alabama provided a more limited basis for jurisdiction
7Section 193 also provides that "in the event such corporation shall fail to ...constitute
and appoint the secretary of state its true and lawful attorney [in the event service cannot be
made on an agent or employee] ... then such corporation shall be deemed to have consented to the secretary of state being its true and lawful attorney, upon whom all such process,
pleadings or papers may be served. . .
8The men served presumably were stringer correspondents, i.e., free-lance writers
supplying an occasional article to a newspaper and paid a fixed sum per word.
9 Brief for Appellants, p. 2. There was no reported opinion.
10 291 F.2d at 495-96.
1IAge-Herald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 45, 92 So. 193, 198 (1921).
12 LA. RE. STAT. ANN. § 13:3471(5)(d) (1950). It is interesting to note the emphasis of
the court: "If the corporation is not one required by law to appoint an agent for service of
process but has engaged in business activitiesin this state, service of process in any proceeding on a cause of action resultingfrom or relatingto such acts performed in this state...
may be made on any employee or agent of the corporation ... or ...on the Secretary of
State.... ." 291 F.2d at 495. Cf. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3471(5)(d) (Supp. 1960) (effective Jan. 1, 1961).

19621

COMMENTS

than did Louisiana. Prior definition of the word "accrue" by the Alabama
Supreme Court had established that a "cause of action accrues as soon as the
party aggrieved is entitled to begin and prosecute such action." 13 The court
of appeals concluded that Alabama, unlike Louisiana, required that a completed cause of action must arise within the state. In the Times case, this requirement was not fulfilled: "We think it too plain for argument that no such
cause of action arose from the work done or anything incidental thereto."14
Thus the judgment of the district court was reversed and the case remanded
with instructions to enter a judgment for the defendants granting their motions
to quash service of process.' 5
The court of appeals was not required to determine a second issue of
statutory interpretation raised by the district court's decision. The correspondent's brief visit was the sole act upon which jurisdiction had been
claimed.1 6 Although the appellees in their brief submitted to the court of
appeals included all of the facts relating to The Times' business contacts in
Alabama,' 7 they did not contend that The Times was "doing business" in
Alabama. Both parties agreed that an afflirmance of the district court decision
would require the interpretation of section 199(1) as a single contact statute.18
Having found no com'Pleted cause of action in Alabama, however, the Fifth
Circuit did not consider this problem of statutory construction.
It was also unnecessary for the court to resolve the constitutional questions raised by the appeal. The publishing company claimed that the application of the Alabama statute to the facts of this case would interfere with the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, violate the due process requirement of the fourteenth amendment, and obstruct interstate commerce. 19
The court of appeals acknowledged that a different construction of the Alabama statute would present a serious constitutional question: "[T]his, of course,
13 291 F.2d at 495, citing LaRue v. C. G. Kershaw Contracting Co., 177 Ala. 441, 445,
59 So. 155, 156 (1912) (interpreting the requirements of a Tennessee statute); Provident
Life & Accidenf Ins. Co. v. Heidelberg, 228 Ala. 682, 684,154 So. 809, 811 (1934); Esslinger
v. Spragins, 236 Ala. 508, 513, 183 So. 401, 405 (1938).
IsIbid.
14 291 F.2d at 496.
16 Although this was a necessary conclusion for the individual defendant, the holding with
regard to the corporate defendant was less clear. Section 199(1) provided that in order to
invoke the provisions of the section, "the party ... desiring to obtain service upon a nonresident ... shall make and file ...an affidavit stating facts showing that this section is
applicable.... ." The sole fact stated was the correspondent's news gathering visit and a
concluding statement that "said defendants engaged in business or performed work or services in the State of Alabama." Brief for Appellants, p. 23. Evidence was presented to the

district court indicating circulation, advertising solicitation and writing contacts in Alabama. Appellants, however, contended that the evidence had been admitted only for the

purpose of determining whether section 193 applied.
17 Brief for Appellees, pp. 1-5.
18 Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 2; Brief for Appellees, pp. 10-25.

19 Brief for Appellants, pp. 26-44.
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is a further reason for construing the Alabama statute strictly as we have if
it is reasonably susceptible to such construction, since courts ordinarily will,
if possible, construe statutes in a manner which will avoid not only declaring
20
them unconstitutional, but also passing on grave constitutional questions."
During the past decade, personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations and
non-resident individuals having only a limited contact with the forum state
has been greatly expanded. 21The United States Supreme Court, however, has
warned against an overly ambitious expansion: "[Ilt is a mistake to assume
that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal
jurisdiction of state courts." 22 The warning of Mr. Chief Justice Warren seems
particularly appropriate for actions involving newspaper libel. Where publications are circulated throughout the nation, the expansion of personal jurisdiction by each state increases the number of forums available. An aggrieved
plaintiff may then choose the most favorable jurisdiction in which to institute
a single suit for multi-state damages or he may bring a separate action in each
state for damages resulting from the circulation of the alleged libel within the
state borders.
The court of appeals decision in the Times case, requiring a completed
cause of action within the forum state, suggests means by which the number
of available forums may be restricted. The implication of the district court
decision, allowing personal jurisdiction based upon a single news gathering
visit, suggests a means for increasing the number of jurisdictions in which a
newspaper may be served as a defendant in a libel suit. This comment will
consider the effect of these converse tendencies and the possible disposition
of similar problems under new legislation.

I
"Publication" is an essential element of liability in an action for libel. To
"publish" a libel is to make it known to any person other than the person
libeled.23 Merely to compose or write a libel, therefore, is not a publication.
According to the common law rule, 24 a separate cause of action arises each
time the alleged libel is revealed to a third party. Newspapers, because of large
circulations within a state and throughout the nation, have presented a special
problem for the traditional rule. A judicial effort has been made in some jurisdictions to reduce the multiplicity of suits possible under the common law
20 291 F.2d at 496.
21 See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961); Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957); Atkins v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
22 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
2

3 Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 44, 92 So. 193, 197 (1921).

24 Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q.B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (1849). This view has
been adopted in RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 578, comment b (1938).
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rule. This doctrine, generally known as the "single publication" rule, has been
restricted to newspapers, 25 magazines, 26 and books.27 Although there is no
general agreement as to the precise requirements of the rule, the underlying
rationale is that only one "publication" will be found within a jurisdiction
adopting the rule. The entire publishing process of editing, printing, transporting, and sale is regarded as a single transaction and a definite time and
place of "publication" is determined. 28
The single publication doctrine was first applied in libel actions where it
was necessary to establish, for purposes of interpreting state venue statutes,
where a libel had occurred. 29 The decision of the Alabama Supreme Court
in Age-HeraldPublishingCo. v. Huddleston,30relied upon by the court of appeals
in the Times case, adopted the single publication rule and its rationale for
determining state venue questions. In the earlier case, the Alabama court had
been required to interpret the provisions of a statute which provided that "all
actions against a domestic corporation for personal injuries must be brought
in the county where the injury occurs ... "31 The action had been instituted
in the county where the plaintiff resided and the newspaper was circulated,
rather than in the county where the newspaper was printed and circulated.The
court concluded that any result other than to require the libel suit to be
brought in the county where the newspaper was printed and primarily cir25

E.g., Insull v. New York World Tel. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. Ill. 1959); AgeHerald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921); Julian v. Kansas City
Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 107 S.W. 496 (1908); Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254
App. Div. 211, 20 N.E.2d 21, 4 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1938).
26
E.g., Dale System v. Time, Inc., 116.F. Supp. 527 (D. Conn. 1953); Hartmann v.
Time, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Winrod v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 62
F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Ill.
1945); Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 M1.App. 59,78 N.E.2d 708 (1948).
Contra, Hartmann v. American News Co., 69 F. Supp. 736 (W.D. Wis. 1947), aff'd., 171
F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1948).
27 E.g., Ogden v. Association of the United States Army, 177 F. Supp. 498 (D.D.C. 1959);
Kilian v. Stackpole Sons, 98 F. Supp. 500 (M.D. Pa. 1951); Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 81 N.E.2d 45 (1948).
28 Prosser, InterstatePublication,51 MicH.L. REv. 959, 974 (1953), lists nine different
steps of publication where it has been suggested that the significant act occurred. There is
agreement, however, that the latest possible date from which the statute of limitations is
calculated is the time of sale to the public.
29 The court in Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 107 S.W. 496 (1908), agreed
there was but one publication but disagreed as to which was the appropriate county in
which to bring the libel action.
30 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921) adopting the view of a dissenting justice in Julian v.
Kansas City Star Co., supra note 29. Accord, Forman v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 195
Miss. 90, 14 So. 2d 344 (1943).
31
ALA. CODE Trr. 7, § 60 (1960). "A foreign corporation may be sued in any county in
which it does any business by an agent... but all actions against a domestic corporation
for personal injuries must be brought in the county where the injury occurs or in the county
where the plaintiff resides, if such corporation does business by agent in the county of plaintiff's residence."
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32
culated could subject a publisher to an unfortunate multiplicity of actions
33
or to trial in the least favorable county.
In addition to defining where publication occurs within a jurisdiction, the
single publication rule has been applied in libel actions in which it is necessary to determine when the statute of limitations begins to run. In these cases
the rule prescribes a definite time from which to calculate the statutory period.
Without the rule, it is difficult to give effect to the policy considerations underlying the rather short statutory period generally allowed for the commencement of litigation for libel and slander. A majority of jurisdictions has prob34
ably adopted the single publication rule in statute of limitation cases.
Although the single publication rule in both state venue and statute of limitations cases has helped to avoid the possibility of endless litigation against a
publisher for each copy of an alleged libel circulated within a given jurisdiction, a danger of multiplicity still remains. In its original form, the single publication rule extended only to the boundaries of the state adopting the rule.
If a newspaper was circulated nationally and if personal jurisdiction over the
defendant was obtained in each jurisdiction, a plaintiff could subject a publisher to separate actions in each state and the District of Columbia even
35
though every jurisdiction had adopted the single publication rule.
The Times decision, however, represents an enlargement of the single publication rule by applying it to state jurisdictional statutes. The enlarged application is an obstacle to allegedly libeled plaintiffs seeking to obtain personal
jurisdiction over out-of-state publishers under modem statutes intended to
expand jurisdictional powers of the state. Either explicitly or implicitly, several courts have reasoned from the definition of situs of injury in state venue
cases to a determination of the origin of a cause of action for purposes of
32 "It is not clear from the older authorities whether an action or prosecution could be
maintained separately and simultaneously and prosecuted to judgment, for every separate
publication of the same libel, or in every jurisdiction where it was circulated. If every separate publication of the identical libel is indeed a separate offense, there is no escape from the
conclusion that separate actions and prosecutions may be simultaneously maintained in
every jurisdiction." 207 Ala. at 43, 92 So. at 196.
33 "We do not see how there can be any conflict of opinion as to the unfairness, injustice,
or impolicy of permitting aggrieved persons, in this class of cases only, to select at their
pleasure any judicial forum within the state where the political, religious, industrial, moral,
or personal predilections of the local citizenship may readily furnish a jury whose biased
views will probably be reflected, however sincerely, in a verdict favorable to them." Id. at
45, 92 So. at 198.
34 Ogden v. Association of the United States Army, 177 F. Supp. 498, 502 (D.D.C. 1959)
(discussing the single publication rule as the "American rule").
35 "It is an amazing and a sobering thought that by the utterance of a single ill-considered
word a man may today commit forty-nine separate torts, for each of which he may be
Prosser, supra note 28, at 959. "Even though
severally liable, in as many jurisdictions ....
we group all copies of a single issue published in one state as a single tort, as we must, it is
possible to view the publication in one state as a wholly separate tort fioma that in any
other .. " Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897, 900 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 858 (1949). The court of appeals rejected this result.
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interpreting statutes allowing personal jurisdiction over non-residents by substituted service.
Some jurisdictional statutes require that substituted service may be obtained only when the cause of action accrues or injury occurs within the given
jurisdiction. The Mississippi provision, forerunner of the Alabama section
construed in the Times case, explicitly states this requirement: "The doing of
such business or the engaging in any such work or service in this state shall
be deemed a signification of such non-resident's agreement, and equivalent
to an appointment... for any cause of action which has accrued or may
accrue in this state."36 The Fifth Circuit concluded that this requirement was
implicit in the wording of the similar Alabama statute. While most jurisdictions do not invoke such a stringent requirement, i.e., that the cause of action
must be completed within the state, they may impose jurisdiction by means
of statutes allowing substituted service only when tortious acts are performed
within the state. The expanded single publication rule has been applied in
each instance either to determine that no completed cause of action accrued
within a state, as in the Times case, or to determine that no tortious act was
committed within the state.
In Insull v. New York World Tel. Corp.,37 the Seventh Circuit applied the
expanded single publication rule to determine that a New York newspaper
did not commit a tortious act in Illinois by circulating copies of an allegedly
libelous article within the state borders. An Illinois citizen attempted substituted service on the out-of-state publishing company under provisions of the
Illinois Civil Practice Act:
Any person... who in person or through an agent does any of the acts
hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits said person... to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the
doing of any of said acts: (a) The transaction of any business within this
State; (b) The commission of a tortious act within this State .... 38
The district court 39 had found that mere circulation within the state was not
"doing business" or "transacting any business." The district court also found
that the defendant did not commit a tortious act within Illinois because no
employee or agent of the defendant was physically present in the state distributing copies of the alleged libel. The latter finding was appealed. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the conclusion but not the reasoning of the lower
court. The court of appeals applied the single publication rule announced in
36 Miss. CODE ANN. § 1437 (1956) (Emphasis added.). Compare MIss. CODE ANN.

§5345 (1956): "Any corporation... found doing business in this state, shall be subject to
suit here to the same extent that corporations of this state are, whether the cause of action
accrue in this state or not."
37 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 942 (1959).

38 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1959).

39 172 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. IM.1959).

576

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:569

prior Illinois decisions and held that the alleged wrong occurred in New
York. Therefore, no tortious act was committed within Illinois. Explicit language indicated that the court consciously adopted the underlying rationale
of the single publication rule theretofore limited to statute of limitations cases
in Illinois. 40
It has been suggested that the North Carolina Supreme Court in Putnam v.
Triangle Publications,Inc.,41 silently adopted the extended single publication
rule.42 The court held that North Carolina's statute exercising jurisdiction
over foreign corporations "not transacting business" in the state43 was unconstitutional as applied to a magazine publisher, because there were no
"minimum contacts" between the defendant and the forum state. Defendant's counsel had argued that no tort had been committed in North Carolina,44 but the opinion did not directly consider this contention. The court
stated, however, that "we agree with the conclusion of the judge below that
plaintiff's cause of action did not arise out of any tortious conduct of the
45
defendant in this state."
The direct result in the Insull, Putnam, and Times cases was to prevent an
expansion of personal jurisdiction by substituted service on out-of-state publishers in libel actions. By declining jurisdiction, the courts forced the plaintiffs to seek other forums for relief. In this way the extended single publication rule is consistent with the desire to reduce multiplicity of multi-state
libels and to compel consolidation of claims for damages to a plaintiff's reputation in several states based on circulation of an allegedly libelous newspaper
46
article.
Changes in jurisdictional statutes47 can eliminate completely the single pub40 273 F.2d at 171 n.3.
41 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957).
42 Note, 35 N.C.L. REV. 535 (1957).
43 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145(a) (1960). The opinion rested upon subsection (3), but the
court also discussed subsection (4), allowing personal jurisdiction where the cause of action
arises "out of tortious conduct in this State, whether arising out of repeated activity or
single acts ..
44 Note, supra note 42, at 540.

45 245 N.C. 432, 443, 96 S.E.2d 445, 454 (1957).
46
E.g., Leflar, The SinglePublicationRule, 25 RocKy MT. L. REv. 263 (1953) (favoring
adoption of the Uniform Single Publication Act); Prosser, supra note 28, (favoring an act of
Congress); Note, 60 HARv. L. REV. 941 (1946) (favoring either the Uniform Single Publication Act or a federal substantive law). The Uniform Single Publication Act, adopted by at
least seven states, provides that "recovery in any action shall include all damages for any
such tort suffered by the plaintiff in all jurisdictions" and that a judgment in any jurisdiction
upon the substantive merits "shall bar any other action for damages by the same plaintiff
against the same defendant founded upon the same publication .... " ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
126, §§ 11, 12 (1959).
47 See statute cited note 93 infra.
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lication rule as a barrier to expanding libel jurisdiction.48 In such cases, however, other obstacles to the assertion of personal jurisdiction may exist.
II
One such obstacle is the present characterization of the Alabama provision as a "doing business" statute. In New York Times v. Connerthe court of
appeals was not required to determine what level of business activity was
necessary to satisfy the wording of section 199(1). The only specific allegation
of work done or services performed by the defendants in Alabama was the

single newsgathering visit by the correspondent. Appellees contended that
section 199(1) allowed service of process on the basis of a single contact between the defendant and the forum state.49 The appellants agreed to the pro-

priety of referring to the section as a "one-act" statute. 50 The Alabama Supreme Court, however, had never interpreted the requirements of section

199(1) in this manner in cases arising under the section.51 Statutory construc-

tion by other state supreme courts of similar provisions also fails to support
such a contention.
In 1940, Mississippi became the first of several5 2 states to adopt a statute

allowing personal jurisdiction by substitution service if "any non-resident...
shall do any business or perform any character of work or service in this
state.... ."53 Although the statute appeared to require only a single contact,
the Mississippi Supreme Court in Lee v. Memphis Publishing Co.54 held that
a Mississippi resident could not obtain personal jurisdiction by substituted
service on a Tennessee publisher even though the newspaper had an extensive
circulation in Mississippi (approximately thirty per cent) and had main48 The single publication rule may be applied in multi-state libel cases to determine the
appropriate conflict of laws solution. This comment does not consider this application of the
rule. For an analysis of the many difficulties associated herewith, see Prosser, supra note 28.
For alternative solutions see Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1949);
Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1948); Brewster v. Boston Herald Traveler
Corp., 188 F. Supp. 565 (D. Mass. 1960).
49 Brief for Appellees, pp. 10-25.
S0 Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 2.
s See Exparte Emerson, 270 Ala. 697, 121 So. 2d 914 (1960); Armi v. Huckabee, 266
Ala. 91, 94 So. 2d 380 (1957). In the latter case substituted service was attempted upon an
absent landlord. The Alabama Supreme Court stated that since section 199 (the non-resident motorist statute) was a valid exercise of state power, the same principle applied to
§ 199(I). For a discussion of Exparte Emerson, see text accompanying note 73 infra.
52 Arkansas' statute (ARK. STAT. § 27-340 (1947)) was adopted in 1947 and Alabama followed in 1949.
53 Miss. CODE ANN. § 1437 (1956). See text accompanying note 36 supra for a more complete version of the provisions.
54 195 Miss. 264, 14 So. 2d 351 (1943). For a recent Arkansas case involving the same
defendant, see Brandon v. Memphis Publishing Co., 194 F. Supp. 376 (E.D. Ark. 1961).
The district court concluded that the defendant was "doing business" in Arkansas.
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tained an office within the state to facilitate the gathering of news, advertising,
and circulation:
Perfect candor constrains us to say that one's first reaction is adverse to
the contention that the Commercial Appeal, with a daily circulation of
approximately forty thousand copies of its papers in this State, is not
doing business here, but.., we must hold that... the defendant is not
55
amenable to the service of process in this state ....
A dissenting opinion suggested that the wording of the 1940 statute was more
comprehensive than prior "doing business" provisions. Subsequent Mississippi decisions, however, affirmed the majority's interpretation of the statute
56
as to the required "doing business."
57
A statute using language identical to that subsequently enacted in Alabama's section 199(1) was adopted in Arkansas in 1947 during the first legislative session following the Supreme Court decision in the InternationalShoes8
case. The Arkansas Supreme Court construed the statute as requiring more
than a single act or several isolated acts to confer jurisdiction. 59 The test
applied was the same as that enunciated prior to the enactment of the new
statute.6
The assumption that statutory language adopted in Mississippi, Arkansas,
and Alabama must necessarily be construed as "doing business" provisions
was applied in the Alabama case of Gayle v. Magazine Management Co.61
Three city commissions of Montgomery brought an action for libel based-on
a magazine story circulated nationally. One of the defendants was the out-ofstate publishing company upon whom service had been attempted under provisions of sections 193 and 199(1). The district court asked: "Were these defendants.., engaged in doing business within the territorial limits of the
State of Alabama ....-62 No distinction between the requirements of each
55 195 Miss. at 283, 14 So. 2d at 355.
56 E.g., Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Ladner, 210 Miss. 863, 50 So. 2d 615 (1951); Mississippi Wood Preserving Co. v. Rothschild, 201 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1953).

57 ARK. STAT. § 27-340 (1947). The Arkansas statute, like the statute adopted later in
Alabama, contains the added phrase, "as an incident thereto."
58 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) rejected older doctrines of
"presence" or "consent" and substituted the flexible tests of "reasonableness and fair play"
to measure the due process limitations imposed upon the states by the fourteenth amendment.
59 See, e.g., the following district court decisions applying state law: Keeshin v. Gordon

Johnson Co., 109 F. Supp. 939 (W.D. Ark. 1952); Green v. Equitable Powder Mfg. Co.,
99 F. Supp. 237 (W.D. 1951); Fritchey v. Summar, 86 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Ark. 1949). See

also Ark-La Feed & Fertilizer Co. v. Marco Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 197 (8th Cir. 1961).
60 "Hesitation to rely on the International Shoe case as authority for expansion of jurisdiction is to be found in the language of the Arkansas Supreme Court .. " McAvoy v.
Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 185 F. Supp. 784, 789 (W.D. Ark. 1960).
61 153 F. Supp. 861, N.D. Ala. 1957).
62 Id. at 866.
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section was made despite differences in statutory language. 63 The court concluded that personal jurisdiction over this defendant had not been obtained
because the irregular trips by one of defendant's employees did not constitute
"doing business" in Alabama. The language of the decision clearly indicated
that the court considered section 199(1), like section 193, a "doing business"
provision. 64
The validity of service of process on non-residents is determined by examining state law to see if the appropriate statute authorizes such service in the
circumstances of the case. If it is determined that state law encompasses the
challenged service, then the constitutional question may be raised: is the
state law as applied within the constitutional limitations of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment? 65 In 1950 the Alabama Supreme Court
announced, in a case arising under section 193,66 that federal law, particularly
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,67 would apply in determining the requisites of "doing business" by a foreign corporation in Alabama. In the Gayle
case, the district court assumed that a "doing business" question was presented and, following the directive of the Alabama Supreme Court, relied on
InternationalShoe:
The Court is also of the opinion that in determining this question, it is
not necessary to be concerned with the Alabama cases that deal with the
matter of the intended sweep of the substituted service statutes, since the
Alabama Supreme Court in 1950... recognized that the Federal law in
such cases controlled ....
68
Thus, in one of the few cases involving construction of section 199(1), the
problem of statutory interpretation merged into considerations of constitutional limitations.
Referring to the facts presented by the InternationalShoe case, the district
court in Gayle observed that: "there [the Supreme Court] set out the extreme
limits that may be gone to in determining that foreign corporations are 'doing
business' within the meaning of the substituted service statutes such as we are
now dealing with."69 The court acknowledged that Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc.,70 advanced a position more per63 Compare statute accompanying note 7 supra with statute following note 9 supra.
64 153 F. Supp. 861, 865-66 (1957).

65 Stranga v. McCormick Shipping Corp., 268 F.2d 544, 548 (5th Cir. 1959), quoted in
New York Times v. Conner, 291 F.2d at 494.
66 Boyd v. Warren Paint & Color Co., 254 Ala. 687, 49 So. 2d 559 (1950).
67 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
68 153 F. Supp. 861, 865 (M.D. Ala. 1957). See also Orange-Crush Grapico Bottling
Co. v. Seven-up Co., 128 F. Supp. 174 (N.D. Ala. 1955).

69 153 F. Supp. at 865. (Emphasis added.)
70 345 U.S. 663 (1953). For an application of Mr. Justice Black's position to a case
involving an alleged libel during a television newscast, see Gearheart v. WSAZ, Inc.,

150 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Ky. 1957), aff'd, 254 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1958). The defendant
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missive than that of InternationalShoe:
Under any of the concepts, old or new, I think Cowles was doing business
in Florida. It had a regular agent there, paid by the month, whose sole job
was to carry on activities for Cowles in order to increase Look's circulation
in that state. On this agent, who managed for the publishing corporation
all the business it carried on in Florida, process was served. These facts,
together with others which I need not labor [i.e. circulation of 50,000
copies in Florida], show the... nature of the "doing business" question.71
However, the Gayle court concluded that even if Mr. Justice Black's position,
advanced by the plaintiff, were to be accepted, the defendant publishing company did not meet this more liberal definition of "doing business."
Decisions announced during the past five years suggest that International
Shoe is not the most extreme of the cases allowing personal jurisdiction over
non-residents consistent with federal due process. Less than six months after
the district court decision in Gayle v. Magazine Management Co., Mr. Justice
Black wrote an opinion for a unanimous court in McGee v. InternationalLife
Ins. Co.72 Personal jurisdiction over the absent defendant was sustained on
the basis of a reinsurance policy mailed into the state by the defendant and the

receipt of premiums mailed from within the state. In 1960, the Alabama
Supreme Court considered a case arising under section 199(l). In Ex parte
Emerson,7 3 the court determined that the defendant was not "doing business"
in Alabama. The opinion noted, however, that Supreme Court decisions such
as InternationalShoe and McGee were part of a trend away from strict requirements for personal jurisdiction.74
station broadcast from West Virginia but was licensed to send its signals into Kentucky.
Although the defendant had no office in Kentucky and received less than four per cent
of its advertising revenues from Kentucky, the court concluded that it was "doing business"
in the state because advertising solicitation was regular, continuous and persistent and the
cause of action was connected with the activities of the defendant in Kentucky.
71 Id. at 670. For a slightly different version of the facts relating to "doing business" see
the decision in the court of appeals, 197 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1952).
72 355 U.S. 220 (1957). "It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based
on a contract which had substantial connection with that State." Id. at 223. It has been suggested that "the connection of the law suit with California [the forum state] was more tenuous
than in any case in which the Supreme Court had ever sustained jurisdiction over an absent
defendant." Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdictionof State Courts, 25 U. Cmi. L. Rav. 569, 607 (1958).
73 270 Ala. 697, 121 So. 2d 914 (1960).
74
In a case now being appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, personal jurisdiction
over The New York Times was asserted on a "doing business" theory. Plaintiffs brought a
libel action based on an advertisement printed in the newspaper. The trial court ruled that
The Times was "doing business" in Alabama because the foreign corporation gathered
news solicited advertising and sold newspapers within the state. The activities of the
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Despite recognition by the Alabama Supreme Court that federal due process does not require a traditional "doing business" test to sustain personal
jurisdiction over absent defendants, there has been no indication that the
present characterization of section 199(1) as a "doing business" statute will
be changed. In the absence of a pronouncement from either the United
States Supreme Court or the Alabama Supreme Court, it is unlikely that
another court would disregard prior interpretation by state courts of the
statutory language of this section. Unanimous statutory construction, reflecting assumptions as to constitutional limitations, presents an obstacle to
invoking personal jurisdiction in situations similar to that in the Times case.
If this difficulty were not present, however, the additional requirement of
causal connection may act as a barrier to obtaining valid service upon out-ofstate newspaper defendants in a libel suit.
M
Statutes asserting personal jurisdiction over non-resident corporations and
individuals often explicitly require that the cause of action being sued upon
be related in some manner to the acts of the non-resident within the forum
state. Thus sections 193 and 199(1) of the Alabama Civil Remedies and Procedures Act require not only that the defendant must have carried on or
transacted business in the state,75 but that the cause of action must arise out
of or as a consequence of that activity. Both requirements must be fulfilled.76
The application is not rigid, however. A flexible standard of causal connection
has been evolved to administer the statutory requirements. 77 Where jurisdiction is based on a high level of economic activity, a more tenuous degree of
causal relationship will not defeat jurisdiction; but where jurisdiction is sought
on the basis of very slight activity, the acts or acts within the forum state must
give rise more directly to the liability charged.
In "doing business" cases arising under statutes similar to Alabama's sections 193 and 199(1), some courts have assumed that the requisite causal connection exists between the publication of a libel and other business activities
of a publishing company within the forum state. In Johnson Publishing Co. v.
"'stringer correspondents" were included as part of the corporate business activities. N.Y.

rimes,Aug. 6, 1960, p. 8, col. 6; Sept. 25, 1960, p. 87, col. 1.
It is generally agreed that circulation alone does not constitute "doing business." There
is, however, great uncertainty regarding the extent of activity necessary to satisfy the definitional requirements. See Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 747 (1954). For more recent cases, see Insull
v. New York World-Tel. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615, 625-27 (N.D. 111. 1959) and Brewster v.

Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 141 F. Supp. 760 (D. Me. 1956).
7
5 See statute accompanying note 7 supra and statute following note 9 supra.
76
See Orange-Crush Grapico Bottling Co. v. Seven-up Co., 128 F. Supp. 174 (N.D.
Ala. 1955).
77 Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 131, 135-37 (1959).
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Davis,78 an Illinois publisher was served pursuant to the terms allowing sub-

stituted service under section 199(1). It was stipulated that the defendant was
"doing business" in Alabama at the time the suit was instituted.79 Neither
counsel nor the court questioned the alequacy of the required relationship
between the cause of action and the activities within the state. 80
When personal jurisdiction is based on a lesser volume of business activity,
however, so that it is not immediately clear that defendant is "doing business,"
the requirement is more closely considered. In New York Times v. Conner
the court of appeals noted the special difficulty which arises when a court examines the causal connection requirement in libel cases: "It is not at all clear
that even in such a case, this tortious act of defamation which presupposes the
false description of what the news gatherer actually saw and heard in Alabama
could be said to have been 'related to' or to have 'resulted from' the acts
performed in Alabama."s1 The court's observation suggests that newsgathering or any other pre-publication activity might never be directly related to the
"publication" of a libel in a degree sufficient to satisfy the requisite statutory
test.
The "publication" requirement for a libel action has so separated the act
of publication from other business activities of a newspaper, such as advertisement solicitation and circulation promotion, that several courts have
noted the difficulty in concluding that the publication of a libel "results
from," "arises from," or is "related to" other economic activities of publishing. In Sonnier v. Time, Inc.8 2 a district court was confronted by the difficulty
suggested in the Times case. Jurisdiction over a non-resident publisher was
attempted under terms of the Louisiana statute noted in New York Times v.
84
Conner.8 3 The defendant's magazine had a large circulation within the state
and was represented there by twelve solicitors.85 Although the extent of business activity was sufficient to meet the minimum requirements of the statute,
the causal requirements were not fulfilled: "[Tihe cause of action here sued
upon [libel for a false advertisement] did not result from and is not legally
related to the acts of the employees or agents of the defendant performed in
86
this state."
78 271 Ala. 474, 124 So. 2d 441 (1960).
79 Id. at 454.
SO ld.at 453-54.
81 291 F.2d at 496 n.2. (Italicized in original.)
82 172 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. La. 1959).
83 See note 12 supra.

84 "Circulation is the source of life to the magazine publisher. Not only are readers a
source of revenue, but their number is an important factor in attracting advertising and
determining rates therefor." 172 F. Supp. at 579.
85 Id. at 578. The defendant also authorized four organizations to take subscriptions for
four of its publications, but this group did not include the magazine in which the alleged
libel appeared.
86 Id. at 580.
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Where the level of activity by the defendant within the forum state is minimal or where jurisdiction is claimed on the basis of a single contact, it has
been suggested that the statutory requirement that the cause of action arise
out of the activity is also a constitutional limitation:87
There are three rules which can be drawn from a combined reading of
InternationalShoe, McGee and Hanson, against which all future litigation
of a like nature may be tested.... The rules are:
(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some
transaction within the forum....
(2) The cause of action must be one which arises out of, or results from,
the activities of the defendant within the forum....
(3) Having established by Rules One and Two a minimum contact between
the defendant and the state, the assumption ofjurisdiction based upon such
contact must be consonant with the due process tenets of "fair play" and
"substantial justice"... .88
In the absence of substantial business activities by the defendant in the
forum state to support personal jurisdiction,89 a court deciding the question
of requisite causal connection in a libel action might conclude that publication of a libel is not "related to" nor did it "result from" any single or isolated contact in the state. The statutory limitation of causal connection, reenforced by constitutional limitations when tenuous contacts exist between
the law suit and the forum state and between the defendant and the forum
state, thus may prevent aggrieved plaintiffs from obtaining personal jurisdiction over out-of-state newspapers in libel actions.
IV
Less than a month after the petition for rehearing in the Times case was
denied, the Alabama legislature passed an act amending section 199(1) so that
it would comply substantially with the wording of the Louisiana statute.9 0 The
new act was generally described as a bill to facilitate the filing of libel suits
against out-of-state newspapers despite the absence of any reference either to
libel or to newspapers. 91The new section thus seems to be an attempt to assert
87 Note, 47 GEo. L. J. 342 (1958).
88 Id. at 351-52. The principles were quoted with approval in Reeder Contractors v.

Higgins Indus., Inc., 265 F.2d 768, 773 n.12 (9th Cir. 1959), and Malavasi v. Villavecchia,
62 NJ. Super. 510, 518-19, 163 A.2d 214, 219 (1960).
89 LaVecke v. Griesedieck Western Brewing Co., 233 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1956). The
Supreme Court in Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), declared
that there were no due process limitations if a state desired to extend personal jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation carrying on substantial business activities even as to causes of
action unrelated to the company's activities in the forum state. See also Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
90 See note 12 supra.
91 N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1961, p. 23, col. 7. See also N.Y. Times, July 22, 1961, p. 21,
col. 3, reporting that one of the sponsors of the bill had admitted that it resulted from the
decision in the Times case in the court of appeals.
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personal jurisdiction even though the cause of action accrues beyond the
borders of Alabama :92
Any non-resident person, firm ... or any corporation not qualified ... as
to doing business herein, who shall do any business or perform any character.of work or service in this state shall, by the doing of such business or
the performing of such work, or service, be deemed to have appointed the
secretary of state.., agent of such non-resident, upon whom process may
be served in any action accrued, accruing, or resulting from the doing of
such business, or the performing of such work or service, or relatingto or as
an incident thereof, by any such non-resident, or his, its or their agent,
servant or employee. And such service shall be valid whether or not the
acts done in Alabama shall of and within themselves constitute a complete
cause of action ....

93

Another court deciding a libel suit similar to New York Times v. Conner
must resolve at least two of the problems of statutory construction not reached
in the Times case. First, it must be determined whether section 199(1) allows
jurisdiction on the basis of a single contact with the forum state. Depending
upon that determination, one of two further questions remains to be answered. If section 199(1) continues to be interpreted only as a "doing business" statute, then the court will be required to determine the degree of
activity which constitutes "doing business" by publishing corporations. If
section 199(1) is to be considered a single contact statute, or a statute allowing personal jurisdiction when there is only a slight number of isolated activities, the court must determine whether the requisite causal relationship
has been satisfied.
These difficulties present a substantial challenge to the expansion of libel
jurisdiction. Moreover, even if these difficulties are resolved in favor of expanded personal jurisdiction, constitutional barriers might exist to defeat such
an expansion. Not only must the due process limitations be considered but
the importance of informed public discussion must be assessed. 94 If the law of
libel seeks to balance the competing policies favoring free communication
and protection of reputation, these considerations should be relevant to the
final determination.
In New York Times v. Conner the court of appeals utilized a well-known
judicial doctrine, the single publication rule, as a means to decrease both the
number of forums available to an aggrieved plaintiff and the possibility of a
92

The new statute seeks to remove the extended single publication rule as a barrier to
obtaining personal jurisdiction in Alabama.
93 H.B. 1026, Act No. 885, approved Sept. 8, 1961. (Emphasis added to indicate new
wording.)
94
The importance of this factor was urged in the motion filed by the Chicago Tribune
Company to file an amicus curiae brief in the Times case. For a discussion of the political
use of libel suits, see Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42
COLuM. L. Rav. 727 (1942); Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair
Comment, 42 CoLuM. L. Rav., 1085, 1282 (1942).
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newspaper being subjected to multiple litigation based upon a single national
publication. Although the Alabama legislature, by amending the statute, has
sought to nullify the effects of the extended rule, the Times decision indicates
a possible means of resolving the problems of multiple litigation for a single
libel. Moreover, the legislature's desire to assure an enlargement of personal
jurisdiction, as expressed in the newly worded statute, may remain unsatisfied despite the possible abrogation of the extended single publication rule.
Since the revised section retains the language of the former section, the
stringent requirements announced in prior decisions, based on assumed statutory and constitutional limitations, will inhibit attempts to expand jurisdictional powers. The alternative requirements, relating to "doing business" or
to direct causal connection between cause of action and activity within the
state, remain as barriers in the path of expanding personal jurisdiction.

